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PAST AS PROLOGUE:
INTERCEPT & SURVEILLANCE RULES UNDER
HONG KONG’S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
By Stuart Hargreaves*

Abstract
In response to civil unrest in 2019, in 2020 Beijing directly applied a new
National Security Law to Hong Kong. Part of this law established a new system of
rules for the authorisation of communications intercepts and covert surveillance
in the context of certain national security offences. Interestingly, this new scheme
looks in many ways like a prior system that was deemed unconstitutional by a
Hong Kong court in 2006: it centralizes authorization authority in the executive
branch and there is little external oversight of the process. This paper argues that
the new system of rules regarding covert surveillance of national security
suspects and the interception of their communications is more than just a
mechanism to ease the detection of national security threats, however. The
Central Authorities have recently stated the Chief Executive of Hong Kong holds
a ‘transcendent position’ over the rest of the local government. This paper
suggests the new scheme shows the purpose of this transcendence – the removal
of the judicial branch from the process allows the Central Authorities to more
effectively ensure the primacy of core state goals through the office of the Chief
Executive.

*

BA, JD, BCL, SJD. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, the Chinese University of
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INTRODUCTION
Hong Kong was gripped by civil unrest for an extended period in 2019, with
violent clashes between protestors and the police making headlines around the
world.1 Though wide-scale street protests ebbed following the emergence of
COVID-19 in early 2020, it was apparent that the Chinese government perceived
an ongoing, and unacceptable, challenge to its authority. In June 2020, Beijing
directly applied a new National Security Law2 (“NSL”) to Hong Kong. That law
outlines a series of offences against national security, establishes a number of new
institutions related to them, and creates various procedural mechanisms that apply
only to their prosecution, in effect setting them apart from the conventional legal
order. This paper focuses on one particular element of the NSL, Art. 43. That
provision details the creation of a new department within the Hong Kong Police
Force tasked with investigating national security offences and provides them with
wide-ranging powers related to the covert surveillance of suspects and the
interception of their communications.
This provision is of interest because it essentially reverses a finding of
unconstitutionality made in 2006.3 Prior to that finding, Hong Kong’s Chief
Executive could order the interception of the communications of any individual in
the name of public security or safety under the Telecommunications Ordinance 4
(“TO”). Subsequent to the 2006 case, the Hong Kong government adopted an
entirely new law – the Interception of Communications and Surveillance
Ordinance5 (“ICSO”) – that was more protective of the right to privacy. The ICSO
required judicial authorization of both the interception of communications and
particular forms of covert surveillance and created a mechanism of public oversight
through an independent commissioner’s office.
This paper shows that in the context of investigating national security
offences the new scheme occasioned by the NSL returns Hong Kong to the preICSO era: it centralizes authorization authority in the executive branch and reduces
1

See, e.g., Chaotic Scenes as HK Protests Turn Violent, BBC, (June 12, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-asia-china-48455370.
2
Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 30, 2020,
effective June 30, 2020) [hereinafter National Security Law].
3
Leung Kwok Hung v. Chief Exec. of H.K., H.C.A.L. 107/2005 (C.F.I.) (Feb. 9, 2006). Though
the substance of the finding of unconstitutionality was not appealed by the Government, the
question of the appropriate remedy was, and this was considered by the Court of Appeal in Leung
Kwok Hung v. Chief Exec. Of H.K., CACV 72/2006 (C.A. May 10, 2006) and the Court of Final
Appeal in Leung Kwok Hung v. Chief Exec. Of H.K. [2006] 9 H.K.S.F.A.R. 441, FACV12/2006
(C.F.A. July 12, 2006).
4
Telecommunications Ordinance, (1963) Cap. 106, § 33 (H.K.).
5
Interception of Communications & Surveillance Ordinance, (2006) Cap. 589 (H.K.).
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external oversight of the process. This paper suggests, however, that the new
scheme is more than just a mechanism to ease the detection of national security
threats. It is an example of the Central Authorities’ intent to exercise
‘comprehensive jurisdiction’ over Hong Kong through the office of the Chief
Executive, who has recently been described as holding a ‘transcendent’ position
over the three branches of Hong Kong’s local government. By concentrating
authorization authority in a transcendent Chief Executive with primary
accountability to the Central Authorities, the new scheme ensures the primacy of
the national interest even though decisions taken regarding intercepts and
surveillance are still taken by local bodies. The complete removal of the judiciary
from the process reflects a belief that the courts of Hong Kong should never be
permitted to act as a check on state goals.
I.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORDINANCE SCHEME & ITS DEMISE
A. The Telecommunications Ordinance in the Colonial Period

The origin of the regulatory framework surrounding the interception of the
communications of criminal suspects dates to before the return of Hong Kong to
Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The TO was enacted by the colonial government in
1962, and read in part:
Whenever he considers that the public interest so requires, the Governor, or any
public officer authorised in that behalf by the Governor either generally or for
any particular occasion, may order that any message or any class of messages
brought for transmission by telecommunication shall not be transmitted or that
any message or any class of messages brought for transmission, or transmitted
or received or being transmitted, by telecommunication, shall be intercepted or
detained or disclosed to the Government or to the public officer specified in the
order.6
While “the public interest” was undefined within the TO itself, the
Secretary for Security declared in 1992 that it referred to “the prevention or
detection of serious crime, including corruption, or in the interests of the security
of Hong Kong.”7 Even so, the circumstances in which the Governor (or his
designated subordinate) could order interception were clearly broad.8 There was no
apparent standard to meet other than a subjective belief in the necessity of the order,
and no requirement to take into account any countervailing interests such as the
6

Telecommunications Ordinance, supra note 4.
Hong Kong Hansard, Nov. 11, 1992, at 634, cited in H.L. Fu & Richard Cullen, Political
Policing in Hong Kong, 33 H.K. L.J. 199, 219 (2003).
8
Leah Angela Robis, When Does Public Interest Justify Government Interference and
Surveillance? 15 ASIA-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTS. & L. 203, 213 (2014).
7
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privacy of the target or third parties who might have had their communications
exposed as a consequence.
Section 33 of the TO was modelled on the UK’s Post Office Act, which
effectively authorized the interception of communications provided it had been
done “in obedience to a warrant under the hand of the Secretary of State.”9 In
Malone10 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found the untrammelled
authority that this gave to the executive branch an unjustifiable restriction upon the
right to respect for one’s private life and correspondence. 11 The absence of a
tailored scheme meant there was not “reasonable clarity the scope and manner of
exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities.”12 Though,
of course, Malone had no direct application to the legal status of the TO in Hong
Kong, the ECtHR's reasoning highlighted the conflict between unconstrained
executive authority and the right to privacy and the problematic aspects of the law
became more pressing following the introduction of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance13 (“BORO”) in 1991. The BORO largely incorporated the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights14 (“ICCPR”) into domestic law, creating a
right to privacy and prohibiting unlawful interference with correspondence.
Questions about the consistency of § 33 of the TO with the quasiconstitutional15 protections under the BORO were asked not only by a variety of
public and professional organizations,16 but eventually by the Governor himself.17
The Post Office Act 1969, c. 45, sch. 5(1) (UK)– rather than directly ‘authorizing’ an intercept,
this provision provided a defence to the offence of interfering with communications under section
45 of the Telegraph Act 1868. See Telegraph Act 1863, 26 & 27 Vict. ch. 112, § 45 (UK).
10
Malone v. the United Kingdom, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984).
11
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
12
Malone, supra note 10, at ¶ 79.
13
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO), (1991) Cap. 383 (H.K.).
14
See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. I say
“largely” because when the ICCPR was signed by the U.K. on behalf of Hong Kong in 1976 it
also entered a reservation to the effect that it did not consider itself bound to apply the ICCPR’s
Art.25(b) commitment to free and open elections to the establishment of either an elected
executive or legislative council in Hong Kong. Reference to this reservation was also
incorporated into section 13 of the BORO and continued in effect after the transfer of sovereignty
in 1997; See, e.g., H.K. LEGIS. COUNCIL PANEL ON CONST. AFFS., REPORTS OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN THE LIGHT OF THE ICCPR, CB(2)602/17-18(04) (2018),
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-18/english/panels/ca/papers/ca20180104cb2-602-4-e.pdf.
15
While the BORO was enacted as a conventional statute, § 3 required that all existing laws be
construed consistently with it to the greatest extent possible. If existing laws could not be so
construed, they were to be repealed to the extent of the inconsistency.
16
See Fu, supra note 7, at 221.
17
Fu, supra note 7, at 220.
9
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At the same time, there were allegations that the Independent Commission Against
Corruption18 (“ICAC”) was using the broad authority granted to it under the TO to
target opponents of the Government.19 In 1996, the Law Reform Commission
(“LRC”) recommended amending § 33 of the TO on grounds that paralleled the
concerns raised by the ECtHR in Malone vis-à-vis the Post Office Act.20 The LRC
argued that the law as it stood was not “sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens
an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which
interceptions may be authorised.”21
The Hong Kong Government issued a White Paper on proposed reform in
February 199722 but did not introduce a bill into the Legislative Council in order to
implement it. A private member’s bill dealing with the same matter was, however,
introduced in April 1997.23 If adopted, that bill would have become the Interception
of Communications Ordinance (“IOCO”).24 The would-be IOCO significantly
circumscribed the Governor’s power to order intercepts, imbuing it instead in the
court, which would act upon applications from identified senior officers in various
departments.25 It was passed by the Legislative Council on June 27, 1997 — four
days before the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom
to China — and signed by the Governor.26 However, the law was never brought
into force by the new Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) government, with
the first Chief Executive arguing that it was unbalanced and its adoption would
unduly hamper law enforcement in the detection and investigation of serious
criminal activity.27 The result was that the TO continued on as the scheme for
interception as of July 1, 1997, with the Chief Executive replacing the Governor as
the relevant authority.28
18

The Independent Commission Against Corruption was established in 1974 as part of an effort
to eliminate widespread corruption in the civil service. Its existence is now constitutionally
guaranteed. See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA Art. 57, § 1 (H.K.).
19
Fu, supra note 7, at 219.
20
See Law Reform Comm’n of Hong Kong, Privacy: Regulating the Interception of
Communications , (1996), https://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/rintercept-e.pdf [hereinafter the
1996 Report]; see also Fu, supra note 7, at 222.
21
Id. at 41.
22
See Law Reform Comm’n of Hong Kong, Privacy: Regulating the Interception of
Communications , CB(2)971/05-06(01) (2006), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0506/english/panels/se/papers/se0207cb2-971-01e.pdf.
23
Alana Maurushat, Hong Kong Anti-Terrorism Ordinance and the Surveillance Society: Privacy
and Free Expression Implications, 12 ASIA PAC. MEDIA EDUCATOR 26, 37 (2002).
24
Interception of Communications Ordinance, No. 109 (1997).
25
See id. at s.5(1-2).
26
Graham Greenleaf & Robin McLeish, The Rule of Law and Surveillance in Hong Kong, 11
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY REPORTER 227, para. 4 (2006).
27
Leung Kwok Hung & Anor v. Chief Executive of Hong Kong, [2006] H.K.C. 230, 86.
28
Greenleaf & McLeish, supra note 27, para. 1
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B. The Telecommunications Ordinance in the SAR-era
The quasi-constitution of the Hong Kong SAR, the Basic Law,29 served to
reinforce the privacy rights of Hong Kong residents, concerns about the law did not
abate with the arrival of the new sovereign. In addition to mandating that the ICCPR
continue to be implemented through domestic law,30 the Basic Law created a
separate constitutional guarantee of communications privacy in Art. 30:
The freedom and privacy of communication of Hong Kong residents shall be
protected by law. No department or individual may, on any grounds, infringe
upon the freedom and privacy of communication of residents except that the
relevant authorities may inspect communication in accordance with legal
procedures to meet the needs of public security or of investigation into criminal
offences.31
Concerns were raised as to whether the virtually unrestricted power of the
Chief Executive to order interception met the threshold of “in accordance with legal
procedures.”32 This mattered greatly because the newly established Court of Final
Appeal had held it not only had the power to declare government legislation
inconsistent with the provisions of the quasi-constitution, but also to declare
legislation to be invalid to the extent of any found unconstitutionality.33
In 2004, the Legislative Council’s Panel on Security published a
comparative report on the governance of the interception of communications as it
occurred in other jurisdictions as part of the Panel’s review of the (failed) 1997
IOCO and what future legislative efforts in this area ought to look like instead.34
The report concluded that allowing the head of government or their designate to
directly authorize interception was an outlier. The other three jurisdictions chosen
for comparison — the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia — all
relied on a more complicated application process for the issuance of interception

The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China, Adopted on 4 April 1990 by the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China at its Third Session. XIANGGANG JIBEN FA.
30
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA, supra note 18, at art. 39, § 1. This continued to be done in the form of
the BORO.
31
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA, supra note 18, at art. 30,
32
See, e.g., Won Hah Ng, Remedies Against Telephone Tapping by the Government, 33 H.K.L.J.
543 (2003).
33
See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R.
34
Research and Library Services Division – Legislative Council Secretariat, Regulation of
Interception of Communications in Selected Jurisdictions, (Feb. 2, 2005) RP02/04-05,
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/sec/library/0405rp02e.pdf.
29
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warrants.35 The report further suggested that the TO’s lack of time limits for
authorizations once issued, lack of internal safeguards, and lack of some form of
oversight were all inconsistent with international practice.36
In the same time period, the courts of Hong Kong were confronted with
related issues in light of the new constitutional structure. In 2005 the lower courts
twice37 considered the impact of the Art. 30 privacy right in the context of covert
surveillance leading to the capture of conversations.38 Li Man-tak39 dealt with an
allegation of bribery, the prosecution of which turned in part on covert audio and
video surveillance made by the ICAC that captured incriminating conversations
between the defendant and others.40 The defence argued in part that this
surveillance resulted in recordings of private conversations and ought to be
inadmissible as evidence of an infringement of the Art. 30 right to privacy.41 The
court noted that while Art. 30 contemplates that authorities may inspect
communications “in accordance with legal procedures,” no relevant framework had
been introduced by the government that detailed these procedures.42 Instead, all that
existed were internally-developed “Standing Orders” by the ICAC, which simply
required an investigator to request approval from a senior officer before the
installation of a surveillance device.43 The court concluded that the opacity and
informality of this process meant that “the only protection the citizen has [against]
unfettered and unsupervised power is the goodwill of the principal investigator.”44
The court went on to consider Malone, suggesting the meaning of “in
accordance with legal procedures” was analogous to that of “in accordance with
law” per Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.45 The court
ultimately concluded that the ICAC’s “Standing Orders” failed to meet the standard
of “in accordance with legal procedures” and there was, in essence, a legislative

35

Id. at 5.2.4. In the UK, warrants would be issued by the executive branch; in the US, by judges;
in Australia, by either the executive branch or by judges depending on the context.
36
Id. at 5.2.6-5.2.27.
37
See Simon NM Young, The Executive Order on Covert Surveillance: Legality Undercover? 35
H.K.L.J. 265, 271-273 (2005).
38
This is distinct from a communications intercept as it does not capture conversations while in
transit within a telecommunications system.
39
See Hong Kong v. Li Man Tak, [2005] H.K.E.C. 1308.
40
Id. at 8.
41
Id. at 13.
42
Id. at 18.
43
Id. at 19.
44
Id. at 22.
45
See Hong Kong v. Li Man Tak, [2005] H.K.E.C. 1308.
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lacuna.46 While the court nonetheless found that the unconstitutionally-obtained
evidence could be admitted under the exclusionary rule,47 it warned that
Now that a Hong Kong court has made a ruling that the installation of covert
surveillance devices is in breach of the Basic Law without proper legal
procedures in place, and unless and until this ruling is overturned, it may
well be held in future criminal trials that the ICAC are acting mala fide if
they continue this practice without some legislative basis.48
In HKSAR v Shum Chui,49 an individual arrested by the ICAC subsequently
served as an undercover informant in exchange for immunity from prosecution.
Activities undertaken as an informant included, inter alia, wearing covert recording
devices in an attempt to gather evidence on multiple defendants.50 The recorded
material included conversations between the informant and one defendant in the
presence of their solicitor.51 Some of that material was introduced as evidence. That
defendant argued that the covert nature of the recording was an infringement on
their fundamental rights and the proceedings should thus be stayed.52
The court concluded that the ICAC knew that the solicitors would be present
at the meeting in question, and thus intentionally recorded and listened to material
that would be prima facie privileged.53 Yet the authorisation of the surveillance
approved by a principal investigator made no mention of the fact that solicitors
would be present at the meeting, which the court considered a “serious flaw” in the
authorisation process.54 This “cynical and flagrant infringement [of the] right to
legal professional privilege”55 of the defendant meant the Government needed to
“introduce the regulations required for lawful covert surveillance as was originally

46

Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 65.
48
Id. at 67. Interestingly, it was revealed during trial that the ICAC had relied on authorization
under s. 33 of the TO to conduct telephone intercepts, which in turn led to the justification for the
audio and video surveillance leading to the capture of the conversations. After ordering a voir
dire, Sweeney J. accepted the legitimacy of these intercepts and no constitutional arguments
against the TO were raised by the defence. See HKSAR v. Li Man Tak & Ors, [2005] H.K.E.C.
1309.
49
HKSAR v. Shum Chiu, DCCC687/2004 (July 5, 2005), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0405/english/panels/se/papers/secb2-2280-1e.pdf.
50
Id. at 8.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 10-11.
53
Id. at 17.
54
Id. at 20.
55
HKSAR v. Shum Chiu, DCCC687/2004 (July 5, 2005), at 33, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0405/english/panels/se/papers/secb2-2280-1e.pdf.
47
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envisaged under the Basic Law. They should do so with all due haste, so that the
guarding of the guards is not just left to the [j]udiciary.”56
These judicial criticisms led the Chief Executive to issue, apparently as an
interim measure while fuller legislation was drafted,57 an executive order (hereafter
referred to as “the Order”) that purported to create a scheme of authorization that
would more tightly regulate certain forms of covert surveillance.58 The Government
stated that no new powers were created by the Order; rather, it merely “clarified”
what law enforcement bodies could do.59 The Order stated — with an important
exception, infra — that any covert surveillance that would lead to the obtaining of
private information about the subject had to be authorized under its terms.
Authorization would only be granted if the relevant authorizing officer deemed it
to be for the purpose of crime prevention or public safety, and if the intrusive
measures were proportionate to the need.60 While Departments were required to
issue guidelines to staff on how the new scheme would operate, the Order explicitly
noted that failure to follow those guidelines would not affect the validity of any
authorization.61 No penalties for failure to comply with the Order were established,
and no judicial oversight was contemplated.62
The Order did not distinguish between covert surveillance and the
interception of communications in the way that later legislation would. “Covert
surveillance” was defined as the systematic surveillance of an individual, carried
out in circumstances where a person was entitled to a reasonable expectation of
privacy, which would likely result in the capture of private information. 63 Though
this broad definition may have meant it could apply to communications intercepts
as a particular species of covert surveillance, the point was never tested in Court.
In any event, the Order specifically excluded from its ambit any surveillance that
was otherwise legally authorised,64 suggesting it would not apply to the Chief
Executive exercising their intercept power under § 33. The Order thus seemed
aimed at only the excesses of law enforcement agencies acting on their own
56

Id. at 53.
Legislative Council Panel on Security, Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedures)
Order, LC Paper No. CB(2)2419/04-05(01) at 4, 13, (Aug. 5, 2005),
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/panels/se/papers/se0815cb2-2419-1e.pdf.
58
The Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedures) Order, Executive Order No. 1 of
2005, S.S. No. 5 to Gazette No. 31/2005,
https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20050931/es5200509312.pdf.
59
Hong Kong Government, CE speaks on Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedures)
Order (Aug. 6, 2005), https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200508/06/08060147.htm.
60
See supra note 58, at s. 3.
61
See supra note 58, at s. 17.
62
Young, supra note 37, at 266.
63
See supra note 58, at s. 2(1).
64
See supra note 58, at s. 2(1).
57
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recognizance as represented in the aforementioned cases, which were cited by the
Legislative Council Panel on Security when introducing the Order.65
Despite the apparent plan for the Order to be temporary in nature, it was
quickly subject to judicial review. Two applicants – both political activists who
believed they were subject to government monitoring in various forms – sought to
challenge the “legislative and administrative framework authorising and regulating
secret surveillance in all its forms.”66 As a result, the court considered the
constitutionality of not only the Order but also § 33 of the TO.67 The essential claim
against the Order was that, since it was not legislation, it could not constitute “legal
procedures” within the meaning of Art. 30 of the Basic Law.68 The applicants then
argued that the entire framework of the TO regarding executive authorization for
intercepts was not substantively compatible with Art. 30.69 Handing down his
decision in February 2006, Judge Hartmann of the Court of First Instance agreed
with the substance of these two arguments.70 He found that while the Chief
Executive was free to issue executive orders containing administrative procedures
governing the behaviour of public servants, including staff of the ICAC, they could
not be classed as “legal procedures” for the purposes of restricting a constitutional
right guaranteed by the Basic Law.71 To do so would substantially derogate from
the protection a right was supposed to offer.72
Further, Judge Hartmann stated that while the Art. 30 communications
privacy right was not absolute, any restriction had to meet the standard of “legal
certainty” or precision such that individuals could accurately govern their
behaviour under the law.
Section 33 has not been formulated with sufficient precision to enable Hong
Kong residents, with legal advice if necessary, to foresee to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances the consequences of any
telecommunication intercourse they may have with others even if those
consequences may not be foreseeable with absolute certainty.73

65

Legislative Council Panel on Security, Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedures)
Order, LC Paper No. CB(2)2419/04-05(01) (Aug 5. 2005) at 3, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0405/english/panels/se/papers/se0815cb2-2419-1e.pdf.
66
See Leung Kwok Hung & Anor v Chief Executive of the HKSAR, [2006] H.K.C.F.I. 123, 3.
67
See Id.
68
Id. at 12-20.
69
Id. at 21-26.
70
He rejected a third argument, however, that the Chief Executive was legally obliged to bring
into effect the IOCO. Id. at 35.
71
Id. at 149.
72
Leung Kwok Hung & Anor v. Chief Executive of the HKSAR, [2006] HKCU 230.
73
Id. at 133-134.
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As a result, the intercept regime created by § 33 of the TO failed to meet
constitutional muster.74 Recognizing the harm that could befall Hong Kong should
there be no ability for law enforcement agencies to conduct covert surveillance,
however, Hartmann J. ordered that the existing scheme be granted a “temporary
validity” period of six months, to allow the Government to bring in more
comprehensive legislation.75
In March 2006, one month after this finding, the LRC issued its second
report on covert surveillance which proposed to regulate activities by both state and
non-state actors.76 Shortly thereafter the Court of Appeal in May 200677 and Court
of Final Appeal (CFA) in July 200678 dealt with various appeals and cross-appeals
regarding the meaning of “legal procedures” and the appropriateness of the socalled “temporary validity order” as a remedy,79 but there was no appeal of the
central holding regarding the unconstitutionality of § 33. At the CFA, Justice
Bokhary made clear that covert surveillance and the interception of
communications was not inherently unconstitutional, but that an adequate balance
needed to be struck between the needs of law enforcement and other societal
interests:
By its nature covert surveillance involving the interception of
communications impacts upon the privacy of the communications which are
intercepted. And the knock-on effect of that is an impact upon freedom of
communication, too. For it is only natural that even law-abiding persons
will sometimes feel inhibited in communicating at all if they cannot do so
with privacy. Nevertheless covert surveillance is an important tool in the
detection and prevention of crime and threats to public security i.e., the
74

Id. at 127.
Id. at 185-186.
76
Law Reform Comm’n of H.K., Privacy: The Regulation of Covert Surveillance (2006)
https://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/rsurveillance-e.pdf (“The 2006 Report”). This report did
not consider the issue of the interception of communications, other than to note that the LRC had
previously issued “final recommendations” in its 1996 Report on the subject, infra (missing note
and page information), including a requirement for judicial authorization. The 2006 Report was
ambitious, proposing to regulate surveillance activities by both state and non-state actors. It
sought to criminalize activities by private citizens that could be interpreted as placing others
under covert surveillance as well as create a constitutionally acceptable regulatory framework
governing covert surveillance by law enforcement. This framework required the issuance of
judicial warrants or departmental authorisation, depending on context; proposed detailed rules
regarding the admissibility of evidence gathered by such surveillance; suggested the creation of
an independent supervisory authority; and outlined a requirement for annual public report on
covert surveillance activities undertaken.
77
Leung Kwok Hung & Anor v. Chief Executive of the HKSAR, [2006] H.K.E.C. 816.
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Koo Sze Yiu & Anor v. Chief Executive of the HKSAR, [2006] H.K.L.R.D. 455.
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See generally Johannes Chan, Some Reflections on Remedies in Administrative Law 39
H.K.L.J. 321, 3-5 (2009).
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safety that the public is entitled to enjoy in a free and well-ordered society.
The position reached upon a proper balance of the rival considerations is
that covert surveillance is not to be prohibited but is to be controlled.80
This meant that the government would have to develop new legislation
governing the interception of communications and surveillance with sufficiently
precise and clear legal procedures for the authorization in order for the law to be
consistent with the Art. 30 right. The result was the introduction in August 200681
of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance (“ICSO”).82
II.
THE INTERCEPTION
ORDINANCE SCHEME

OF

COMMUNICATIONS

AND

SURVEILLANCE

The ICSO separates the interception of communications and covert
surveillance as distinct activities and divides the latter into two forms.83
“Interception” is defined as the inspection of the “content” of communications “in
the course” of transmission.84 “Type 2” covert surveillance is that carried out
through optical or listening devices on someone whom the target might reasonably
expect to be able to hear or see them. For example, the use of a wire to record a
conversation between a target and an informant would be “type 2” covert
surveillance.85 Type 2 can also involve the use of tracking devices providing there
is no entry into private premises without permission or interference with any object
—for example, a GPS tracker attached to a car. “Type 1” is any other form of covert
surveillance, such as the placing of a recording device inside someone’s home, or
the installation of a backdoor allowing remote access into a target’s computer.86

80

See supra note 78, at 3.
The urgency with which the Legislative Council adopted the new law is notable – there was
clearly a concern that law enforcement agencies would be dramatically weakened if the
government failed to act within the six-month window granted to them by the courts.
82
ICSO, supra note 5.
83
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 2.
84
ICSO, supra note 5. “In the course” refers to activities such as monitoring real-time telephone
conversations or opening postal documents in transit. Once the transmission has ceased (that is,
the information has reached its destination), then conventional search and seizure rules apply. The
Court of Appeal has held that the warrantless search of the content of mobile phones seized
incidental to arrest may be acceptable in limited scenarios, such as where it is immediately
necessary to preserve information related to the arrest or to protect those at the scene; outside
such scenarios, a warrant is required to obtain information off an electronic device See Sham
Wing Kan v. Commissioner of Police, [2020] H.K.C.A., at 186.
85
See ICSO, supra note 5.
86
See ICSO, supra note 5.
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Any type 2 surveillance that is likely to result in the acquisition of legally privileged
material is automatically re-classed as type 1.87
The ICSO treats the interception of communications and type 1 surveillance
as more serious intrusions, and so requires judicial authorization for them.88 An
application may be made for authorization to one of a specific list of judges (“panel
judges”), drawn from the Court of First Instance and appointed for a period of three
years by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of the Chief Justice.89 The
application for authorization must include an affidavit stating the purpose of the
interception or surveillance, the method, the proposed duration, the likely benefits,
an assessment of the impact upon third parties, and the reason the purpose cannot
be reasonably furthered by less intrusive means.90 A judge shall not approve an
application for authorization unless they are satisfied the purpose is for the
prevention or detection of serious crime or protecting public security, that there is
a reasonable suspicion that the target is connected to those matters, and that the
interception or surveillance is proportionate.91 The introduction of the judicial
authorization component is perhaps the most significant aspect of the ICSO and, as
will later be shown, one of the key points of divergence from the new scheme
introduced under the NSL. Judicial authorization for communications intercepts or
covert surveillance serves the same principle as a judicial warrant in cases of search
and seizure: a bulwark against overly intrusive state action, even though said action
furthers a legitimate aim.92
Type 2 surveillance is treated under the ICSO as less serious, and so requires
only “executive authorization” for approval.93 Such authorization requires the
provision of the same information as required for a judicial authorization but is
made not by a judge but by a departmental “authorizing officer”.94 The head of the
87

See ICSO, supra note 5. The Law Reform Commission recommended in its 2006 Report (supra
note 75) that judicial warrants be mandatory for any surveillance operation regardless of form
where confidential journalistic material or highly sensitive personal data was likely to be
acquired. The ICSO does not do the same but does require that the probability that journalistic
material will be acquired be identified in the application for either a judicial warrant or executive
authorization. The Code of Practice (infra p. 15 and note 98) further requires law enforcement
agencies to report to the Commissioner any situation in which they do happen to come across
such material.
88
ICSO, supra note 5.
89
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 6.
90
ICSO, supra note 5, at Schedule 3.
91
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 3, 9(2)
92
Attorney General of Jamaica v. Williams, [1998] AC 351, 358F-G, per Hoffman LJ (cited in
Keen Lloyd Holdings Ltd & Ors v. Commissioner of Customs & Excise & Anor [2016] H.K.C.A.
150, 74.
93
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 14.
94
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 14-15.
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department can assign that role to any officer of rank equivalent to or higher than a
senior superintendent of police.95 The authorizing officer is only to approve the
request if they are satisfied the same proportionality requirements described above
are established.96 Authorizing officers may also entertain “emergency” applications
for type 1 surveillance or interception of communications where there is an
immediate need, such as to prevent a serious harm to person, damage to property,
threat to public security, or loss of vital evidence, and it is not reasonably
practicable to apply for judicial authorization.97 Application for judicial
authorization must still be made within 48 hours of an emergency authorization
being granted and repeat emergency authorizations are not allowed.98 The Secretary
of Security has issued a Code of Practice ( “CoP”) for officers in law enforcement
agencies tasked with following these rules,99however, any failure to follow that
Code does not affect the validity of a prescribed authorization.100
The ICSO also created the office of the Commissioner on Interception of
Communications and Surveillance.101 The Commissioner is to be appointed for a
term of three years by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of the Chief
Justice and drawn from either the current or former members of the Court of First
Instance or the Court of Appeal, or former members of the Court of Final Appeal.102
The Commissioner is to review the operation of the ICSO generally and compliance
by departments as they consider necessary; this includes reviewing all applications
made for emergency authorizations, renewed authorizations, and any reports
received from departments regarding potential non-compliance by their officers.103
The CoP requires that departments offer assistance to the Commissioner in
performing their oversight duties. This practice currently involves submitting
weekly reports on all requested and ongoing prescribed authorizations.104
The Commissioner is to produce an Annual Report to the Chief Executive
detailing statistics of all applications and authorizations, any instances of noncompliance by departments, and any instances in which disciplinary action was
95

ICSO, supra note 5, at § 7.
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 3, 15(2).
97
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 20.
98
ICSO, supra note 5, at 23(3).
99
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 63. See generally Code of Practice Issued Pursuant to Section 63 of
the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance, (2016) Cap. 589 (H.K.),
https://www.sb.gov.hk/eng/special/sciocs/2016/ICSOCoP-June2016E.pdf. [hereinafter CoP].
100
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 63(5).
101
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 39.
102
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 40.
103
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 41.
104
CoP § 147; A.R. Suffiad, OFF. OF THE COMM’R ON INTERCEPTION OF COMMC’N AND
SURVEILLANCE, ANN. REP. 2019 TO THE CHIEF EXEC. 11-12 (2020),
https://www.sciocs.gov.hk/en/pdf/Annual_Report_2019.pdf.
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taken for such non-compliance.105 These reports are publicly available.106 In the
reports, the Commissioner may also make recommendations to the Secretary of
Security on updating the CoP107 and make recommendations to individual
departments on ways to improve compliance.108 The Commissioner may also hear
public complaints from individuals who believe they have been placed under covert
surveillance or had their communications intercepted in a way inconsistent with the
ICSO and may make awards of compensation if they believe the terms of the law
have been breached.109
Without doubt, the ICSO provides for more robust regulation of the
interception of communications and covert surveillance than § 33 of the TO and the
Order. In addition to establishing clear standards that must be met for authorization
of relevant intercept and surveillance activities, the ICSO creates a system of
meaningful oversight to which the public has access. At the same time, the ICSO
is imperfect and has been criticized on a number of grounds. In particular, it seeks
only to regulate the behaviour of public actors.110
The narrowness of the law goes beyond those subject to its terms, however.
As noted, the interception provisions apply only to “content” of a message in “the
course of transmission.”111 This has at least two consequences. First, it completely
excludes metadata from the ambit of the law, meaning law enforcement agencies
are free to try and build out a picture of communication networks between contacts
105

ICSO, supra note 5, at § 49
All such reports produced since the inception of the ICSO are available at “Annual Reports”,
Secretariat of the Commissioner on Interception of Communications and Surveillance,
https://www.sciocs.gov.hk/en/reports.htm.
107
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 51.
108
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 52.
109
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 44.
110
The Security Bureau argued at the time of the ISCO’s introduction that while criminal
offences for the interception of communications by private individuals were necessary (in line
with the LRC’s recommendations in the 2006 Report), they were better left to separate legislation
– but no such legislation has ever been introduced. As a result, the ICSO does nothing to regulate
the private behaviour of Hong Kong residents in terms of cybercrime, hacking, or doxing. (See
Urania Chiu, 12 Years On: Implications of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance
Ordinance on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in Hong Kong, 49 H.K. LAW J. 487, 493-494
(2019). The Hong Kong Bar Association has also criticized the ICSO’s focus only on public
officers (see generally H. K. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE BAR ASS’N ON THE INTERCEPTION
OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE, CAP. 589 (2011), available online at:
https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/20110909.pdf. Kellogg has also criticized the ICSO for
not applying to Mainland law enforcement agencies (see generally Thomas E. Kellogg, A Flawed
Effort? Legislating on Surveillance in Hong Kong, H.K.J. (2007)), but it seems implausible that
the Government would have drafted a law to apply to Mainland agents that (at least in 2006)
would not legally have been operating within Hong Kong.
111
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 2.
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with no oversight whatsoever. Second, it means that once a message has been
“delivered,” a law enforcement agency does not need to seek authorization under
the ICSO to obtain it. The Service-Based Operator License that internet and mobile
phone service providers must obtain states that they may disclose the information
of customers for the prevention or detection of crime.112 It appears as though they
regularly agree to provide such information on request from the police, meaning
the ICSO’s interception provisions are likely of reduced relevance in the context of
instantaneous digital communications.113 Indeed, the Secretary for Security has
avoided directly explaining whether law enforcement agencies should seek
authorization under ICSO in order to access delivered communications such as
emails or instant messages.114
The ICSO has also been criticized by several scholars as being predisposed
to granting authorizations requests. Kellogg, for example, criticizes the panel judge
system as insufficiently distant from the executive branch.115 But while the
appointment power of the Chief Executive regarding the panel judges may raise
questions about the separation of powers, those judges are still drawn from the
membership of the Court of First Instance and are only appointed upon the
recommendation of the Chief Justice.116 They are not unknown figures plucked out
of obscurity by the Chief Executive who might owe some personal loyalty. While
one could obviously conceive of a system of judicial appointment further removed
from the possible influence of the executive branch, the model established under
the ICSO does not appear unduly problematic.
Tsui argues that the ICSO’s judicial authorization process itself is
inadequate, calling it a “rubber stamp process.”117 He points to statistics that
suggest the overwhelming majority of requests made under the ICSO are approved
and questions whether making law enforcement agencies jump through procedural
hoops makes any practical difference.118 Certainly, the most recent Annual Reports
could be read in a way that lend credence to Tsui’s concerns. In 2019, a total of
112

See generally Telecommunications Ordinance § 7; See, e.g., Telecommunications Ordinance
Sample Unified Carrier Licence, Cap. 106, 4 § 7.1 (H.K.), https://www.comsauth.hk/filemanager/common/licensing/sample_ucl_licence.pdf.
113
See e.g., Lokman Tsui, The coming colonization of Hong Kong cyberspace: government
responses to the use of new technologies by the umbrella movement, 8 CHINESE J. OF COMMC’N 1
447, 450 (2015); Stuart Hargreaves, Online Monitoring of 'Localists' in Hong Kong: A Return to
Political Policing? 15 SURVEILLANCE AND SOC’Y 425, 427 (2017); Chiu, supra note 110, at 502.
114
Legislative Council Press Release LCQ15, A question by the Hon Kenneth Leung and a
written reply by the Secretary for Security, Mr. Lai Tung-kwok, in the Legislative Council (Apr.
29, 2015 HKT 15:23), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201504/29/P201504290534.htm.
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Kellogg, supra note 110, at 4.
116
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 6.
117
Tsui, supra note 113, at 450.
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Tsui, supra note 113, at 450.
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1335 prescribed authorizations were issued: 1,310 for interception, 22 for type 1,
and three for type 2.119 Only four applications (0.3%) were refused, all for
interception.120 In 2018, a total of 1,378 prescribed authorizations were issued:
1,337 for interception, 41 for type 1, and none for type 2. Only six applications
(0.4%) were refused, all for interception.121 On the one hand, these kinds of
statistics might indeed mean that obtaining a judicial authorization is a relatively
straightforward process for law enforcement.
However, they could also be interpreted in a different light. For example,
they might represent improved knowledge on the part of law enforcement agencies
as to what kind of applications are likely to be approved and the form in which they
must be presented. After all, in the law’s first year of operation, 2006, 11% of
applications were refused, but that number quickly dropped.122 It seems more
plausible that law enforcement agencies changed their approach after failure to
obtain authorizations than that panel judges all suddenly decided to lower their
standards. The Annual Reports also do not reveal to what extent panel judges or
those involved in the initial drafting of authorization requests push back on the
demands of law enforcement agencies. It seems reasonable to assume that panel
judges take the proportionality question seriously as it is a well understood principle
in Hong Kong law. While it is fair to note that the judiciary seems on the whole to
be relatively deferential to government interests as compared to their counterparts
in other jurisdictions,123 it would be strange to think panel judges simply accept any
law enforcement request with which they are presented, without seriously
considering its implications. While acknowledging much of this is speculative, it
does seem probable that the presence of the panel judges means authorization
requests are drafted in narrower terms than would otherwise be the case.124
Chiu critiques the oversight process from a different angle, contending that
the supervision of law enforcement agencies in terms of their compliance with the
ICSO remains lax. She argues that where complaints are brought to the
Commissioner the result is typically that failures to comply with the procedures are
119

Suffiad, supra note 104, at 6.
Suffiad, supra note 104, at 6.
121
Suffiad, supra note 104, at 6.
122
For comparison, in the law’s first year of operation (2006) 11% of applications were refused,
but that number quickly dropped (1.8% in 2007, 1.4% in 2008, etc). See Suffiad, supra note 104,
at 6.
123
See, e.g., Rehan Abeyratne, More Structure, More Deference: Proportionality in Hong Kong
PROPORTIONALITY IN ASIA Po Jen Yap ed., (2020).
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Young shows the Reports have described attempts by law enforcement to minimize scrutiny
from the Commissioner and opposition to orders from the panel judges, again suggesting that
both serve to constrain the wishes of law enforcement agencies; see Simon NM Young,
Prosecuting Bribery in Hong Kong’s Human Rights Environment, 272, MODERN BRIBERY LAW:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Jeremy Horder J and Peter Alldridge eds., 2013).
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considered to be “honest mistakes.”125 Chiu is right that a more confrontational
approach from the Commissioner might improve departmental level compliance at
a procedural level, but in my view the most valuable aspect of the Commissioner’s
oversight role comes in the publication of the Annual Reports. While not always
providing a complete picture, those reports mean the public and the media have
some window into law enforcement intercept or covert surveillance operations that
they otherwise would simply not have. This is an important form of oversight that
exists beyond bare procedural compliance. Young notes, for example, that in the
context of the operations of the ICAC, the Commissioner’s Annual Reports helped
increase public awareness and generate pressure on the ICAC to reform some of its
practices.126
Greenleaf generally sees the ICSO in a positive light, concluding it has
resulted in “a relatively high degree of accountability and transparency” in the
conduct of covert surveillance and interception operations by law enforcement.127
The courts seem to take the same view and have treated the basic approach to
authorization under the law with approval. The Court of Appeal, for instance, has
found that the executive authorization scheme for type 2 surveillance is a
constitutionally justifiable limitation on the Art. 30 privacy right:
When the justification for the measure is taken together with the after-theevent judicial supervision safeguards that are in place and regard is also had
to the fact that the executive authorization only permits low levels of
intrusiveness into the privacy rights of others, we are of the view that the
measure of executive authorization is one that cannot be said to be
manifestly without reasonable foundation. The use of executive
authorizations for Type 2 surveillance is, therefore, constitutional.128
In addition, though it has not heard a direct challenge to the ICSO’s
authorization scheme for more intrusive type 1 surveillance or interception, the
CFA has spoken in a general sense about the validity of the overall framework,
arguing it “provides the machinery and framework for striking [the] balance”
between law enforcement interests and the privacy of communications.129 On the
heels of ongoing and often violent civil unrest on the streets of Hong Kong in 2019,
125

Chiu, supra note 110, at 496.
Young, supra note 124, at 269-272.
127
See Graham Greenleaf, Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy
Challenges in Particular in Light of Technological Developments: Country Study B.3 – Hong
Kong, European Commission Directorate-General Justice, Freedom, and Security (May 2010).
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HKSAR v. Yu Lik Wai William & Anor, [2019] H.K.C.A. 135, 286.
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Ho Man Kong v. Superintendent of Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre, [2014] H.E.C. 424, 7 (per
Ribeiro PJ). The cited passage is obiter; in Ho Man Kong the CFA concluded that Art. 30 of the
Basic Law did not render intercepts of communications obtained in foreign jurisdictions
inadmissible as evidence in extradition proceedings in Hong Kong.
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a spanner was thrown into this machinery in the form of the National Security Law
(NSL).
III.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW SCHEME

On May 28, 2020, the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) authorized its
Standing Committee (“NPCSC”) to draft and pass a law for Hong Kong aimed at
preventing a range of acts it considered harmful to China’s national security and/or
territorial integrity.130 The resulting law, the NSL, was adopted on June 30, 2020,
and inserted into Annex III of the Basic Law, coming into force in Hong Kong
immediately after promulgation by the Chief Executive. The substance of the law
has been well considered elsewhere,131 and this article focuses only on a single
element: Art. 43. which deals with the powers of a newly established Department
for Safeguarding National Security within the Hong Kong police force. 132 It
provides that in addition to all pre-existing powers law enforcement bodies have,
this Department may take further measures when investigating matters of national
security, including “upon approval of the Chief Executive, carrying out interception
of communications and conducting covert surveillance on a person who is
suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having [been] involved in the commission of
an offence endangering national security.”133
Art. 43 further gives the Chief Executive, working in conjunction with a
new National Security Committee,134 the authority to make procedural rules that
explain in more detail how such interception or surveillance will be approved.
Relevant rules came into force on July 7, 2020.135 In the following discussion, I
will explain the key elements of the new scheme and note in particular where it
diverges from the ISCO. The two most significant changes are the removal of the
130

Decision on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security, Adopted at the
Third Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress (May 28, 2020),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A215.
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See, e.g., Cora Chan, Can Hong Kong remain a liberal enclave within China? Analysis of the
Hong Kong National Security Law, PUBLIC LAW 271 (Mar. 15, 2021)); Simon NM Young, The
Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region 60 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (2021); Han Zhu, The
Hong Kong National Security Law: The Shifted Groundnorm of Hong Kong’s Legal Order and
Its Implications, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper, (2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3812146.
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This department is established by virtue of Art. 16 of the NSL.
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National Security Law, at Art. 43(6), at 20.
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This committee is established by virtue of Art. 12 of the NSL.
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Comm. For Safeguarding Nat’l Sec. of the H.K. Special Admin. [HKSAR], Implementation
Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China, A406A (July 7, 2020),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A406A!en.
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judicial authorization scheme and the reduction in mechanisms of external
oversight.
The Art. 43 Implementation Rules (the “Implementation Rules”) state that
an authorization for the interception of communications or covert surveillance
made under Art. 43 will only be granted for the purpose of preventing or detecting
offences endangering national security or protecting national security. This means
for non-national security crimes the ICSO remains the relevant law. For an
authorization to be granted under Art. 43, the Implementation Rules hold that there
must be a reasonable suspicion the target is involved in those offences or an activity
that may constitute a threat to national security and the interception or surveillance
must be necessary and proportionate in terms of the balance between the purpose
and its intrusiveness, both in terms of intrusiveness on the target and third parties.136
The language here largely mirrors that found in the ISCO, with alterations to refer
to national security rather than serious crime or public security.137 The definitions
of interception and covert surveillance, including the difference between type 1 and
type 2, bear the same meanings in the Implementation Rules as they do in the
ICSO.138 The Implementation Rules stipulate that a set of Operating Guidelines are
to be issued to the police regarding matters that fall under the NSL.139 This parallels
the requirement in the ICSO for the Secretary for Security to develop a Code of
Practice for implementation.140 As with the Code, while officers must comply with
the Operating Guidelines a failure to do so will not affect the validity of any
authorization and no criminal or civil liability will be incurred as a result.141
The Implementation Rules also define two modes of authorization, but there
are significant differences in their substance in comparison to those under the ICSO.
Under the first mode, an officer within the National Security Department of the
police may apply in writing to the Chief Executive for the authorization of
interception, type 1, or type 2 surveillance.142 This essentially replaces the judicial
authorization process established under the ICSO, which was limited to
interception and type 1 surveillance. The application must contain a description of
136

Id. at Schedule 6 § 2.
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 3.
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ICSO, supra note 5, at § 2; See the Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6 § 27.
139
See The Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6 § 20. An initial set of Guidelines
were issued in July 2020. Secretary for Sec., Operating Principles and Guidelines for Application
for Authorization to Conduct Interception and Covert Surveillance Issued Pursuant to Section 20
of Schedule 6 of the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the of the People’s Republic of China
for on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, G.N.
(E.) 74 (July 6, 2020) https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20202450e/egn2020245074.pdf [“The
Operating Guidelines”].
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See ICSO, supra note 5, at § 63, 65.
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See the Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6 §§ 20(3), 21.
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the form of interception or surveillance, its purpose, the likely benefits, the
proposed duration, the likelihood of privileged or journalistic material being
obtained, and other similar information.143 This mirrors the content of similar
applications made under the ICSO,144 though of course, the identity of the ultimate
decision-maker is different as it is the Chief Executive rather than a panel judge.
Under the Implementation Rules, a second mode of authorization replaces
the “executive authorization” scheme found in the ICSO. The Chief Executive may
designate a “directorate officer” to review applications for and authorize type 2
surveillance.145 This appears to create a slightly higher threshold, since a directorate
officer is defined in the Implementation Rules as a police officer “not below the
rank of chief superintendent of police.”146 In contrast, an authorizing officer under
the ICSO need only be of a rank equivalent to that of a senior superintendent, which
is one rank below that of a chief superintendent.147 The content of the necessary
written application is otherwise similar to that found in the ICSO, dealing with
purpose, proposed duration, proportionality, etc.148 The Operating Guidelines
indicate that notwithstanding the form of surveillance being type 2, if there is a
likelihood that journalistic material will be obtained as a result then the application
ought to be made to the Chief Executive rather than the directorate officer.149
The requirements for renewing authorizations are the same under both the
ICSO and the Implementation Rules, including stating whether there has been any
significant change to information previously supplied, why a renewal is necessary,
and the value of information obtained so far.150 However, while both initial and
renewed authorizations made under the Implementation Rules can last a maximum
of six months,151 under the ICSO they can only last
for three months.152 On the
other hand, since both frameworks allow for indefinite repeated renewals the
practical difference may be minimal.
A further similarity deals with emergency applications. Under the
Implementation Rules, emergency applications for communication intercepts and
143

See the Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6 §§ 23, 24.
ICSO, supra note 5, at Schedule 3, Part 1 and 2.
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The Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6, § 5.
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The Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6, § 27.
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See The Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at Schedule 6 §§ 5(2), 24; See also ICSO,
supra note 5, at § 14(1), Schedule 3 Part 3.
149
See The Operating Guidelines, supra note 139, at § 12.
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type 1 surveillance may be made to the Commissioner of Police instead of the Chief
Executive153 on the same grounds that an emergency application may be made
under the ICSO to a department head instead of to a panel judge.154 Both specify a
48-hour time limit for any emergency authorization that is granted, both provide
that it cannot be renewed by the same emergency process,155 and both require a
written follow-up application within 48 hours to the proper authorizing figure.156
The Operating Guidelines indicate that failure to make a written application within
the 48-hour period must be reported to the National Security Committee, whereas
a similar failure under the ICSO would be reported to the Commissioner.157
The Implementation Rules and the ICSO are identical in terms of the
specific matters that a Chief Executive or panel judge can authorize, such as the
forced entry into premises to install devices.158 They are also broadly similar in
describing specific matters that cannot be authorized. Both, for instance, state that
authorization to intercept the communications of a lawyer or place their offices
under covert surveillance will not be granted unless “exceptional circumstances”
exist.159 The Operating Guidelines make clear that if legally protected products are
likely to be obtained by proposed surveillance, then authorization must be
personally obtained from the Chief Executive even if the form of covert
surveillance to be undertaken is type 2.160 While only a guideline rather than part
of the Implementation Rules directly, this mirrors the principle found in the
ICSO.161 There is, however, one curious difference between the two schemes in
matters that cannot be authorized. The ICSO explicitly states that “for the avoidance
of doubt, a prescribed authorization does not authorize any device to be implanted
in, or administered to” a person without the consent of that person.162 The
Implementation Rules contain no such prohibition.
153

See The Implementation Rules, supra note 135, at § 9.
ICSO, supra note 5, at § 20.
155
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Some relatively similar post facto protections for intercept products exist
across the schemes. Under the ICSO, it is the responsibility of the head of
department to ensure minimum disclosure of any protected product, protection
against its unauthorized access or processing, and procedures for its ultimate
destruction.163 Under the Implementation Rules, these same responsibilities fall to
the Commissioner of Police.164 Both the Implementation Rules and the ICSO treat
interception products as inadmissible as evidence other than to prove a relevant
offence has been committed.165 Any such product “must not,” per the
Implementation Rules, or “shall not,” per the ICSO, be made available to any party
to proceedings, other than proceedings instituted for the relevant offence.166
However, unlike the ICSO the Implementation Rules does not place a duty
upon law enforcement agencies to disclose information obtained through a
prescribed authorization that may undermine the case for the prosecution to the
prosecution, nor a duty upon the prosecution to disclose that information to the
judge.167 Interestingly, though still contained in the text of the ICSO, this provision
was found unconstitutional in Yu Lik Wai William on the grounds that it was a
disproportionate restriction on the right to a fair trial, as it allowed the police to
decide if the information should be disclosed or not.168 The Court chose to offer a
remedial interpretation of the relevant provision such that any information obtained
pursuant to a prescribed authorization must be provided to the prosecution, and in
turn the prosecution is obliged to disclose the information to a judge in an ex parte
hearing should they believe it might reasonably be considered capable of
undermining the prosecution or assisting the defence.169 The Implementation Rules
do not adopt this language, nor do they create a disclosure regime of any kind. This
suggests it will be up to the National Security Department of the police to determine
when to reveal intercept products to the prosecution. Presumably, if such a decision
is taken, then the common law disclosure principle will continue to apply to the
prosecution. In other words, if the prosecution receives intercept products they
reasonably believe may undermine their case, they must disclose them to the
court.170
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A key divergence between the Implementation Rules and ICSO regards
oversight. Though the Implementation Rules conceive of an “independent person”
being appointed by the Chief Executive to “assist” the National Security Committee
in its overall supervisory role under Art. 43, who that may be or what the particulars
of the role will be is as yet unknown.171 It appears not to be the Commissioner on
Interception of Communications and Surveillance, who goes unmentioned in both
the Implementation Rules and the Guidelines. While it is conceivable that the
Commissioner might still at least receive an initial complaint from an individual
who believes they have been placed under covert surveillance or had their
communications intercepted on national security grounds, their involvement seems
to end if there is in fact evidence a national security offence is at issue. This means
that the Commissioner’s formal role in reporting and reviewing surveillance
practices appears confined to applications for authorizations made under the ICSO,
and they will not be involved in any kind of review of applications made under the
Implementation Rules.
This supposition is strengthened by the Operating Guidelines, which
indicate that a system to review authorizations and compliance by officers with the
overall framework is to be made by the Commissioner of Police,172 and that system
is to be run by an individual of rank not below Assistant Commissioner of Police.173
There is no requirement that the results of those reviews be revealed to the public.
The only system for monitoring compliance of officers is self-reporting by the
police of instances of non-compliance to the National Security Committee.174
Combined with the absence of a robust freedom of information law in Hong
Kong,175 there appears little prospect for even statistical scrutiny of national
security related intercepts or surveillance activities by the public or the press.
In sum, while the Implementation Rules share many procedural elements
with the ICSO, there is a clear intention to remove non-executive branch bodies
from the process of investigating national security offences. This is shown most
clearly through the removal of the judicial component of the authorization scheme
and the reduction of external oversight. Though applying only to matters related to
national security offences, this means the new system appears in part like a return
to the pre-ICSO period, creating a detailed procedural system governing

“Presumably”, however, because the operation of the NSL makes this uncertain until tested in the
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authorizations whilst concentrating ultimate decision-making power over those
authorizations in the executive branch.
V.
THE NEW SCHEME
EXECUTIVE

AS AN

EXAMPLE

OF THE

“TRANSCENDENT” CHIEF

While the pre-ICSO scheme was, as noted, ultimately deemed
unconstitutional, it is important to be clear on what the courts of Hong Kong have
and have not said about it. While the overall framework for interception and
surveillance occasioned by § 33 of the TO and the Order was found wanting, the
Order itself fell only because as an executive order it could not function as “legal
procedures” for the purposes of limiting the Basic Law’s guarantee of privacy.176
No particular analysis of the substance of the Order as a scheme for authorization
was made at first instance or on either appeal.177 The content of the Order itself was
therefore never subject to a robust constitutional analysis —only the form of its
enactment. While the CFA acknowledged that in a general sense an intercept
regime “must sufficiently protect… fundamental rights and freedoms”178 it was
never asked nor did it state whether judicial authorization was necessary to do so.179
In the ICSO-era, while the Court of Appeal did say in Yu Lik Wai William that the
ICSO’s executive authorization scheme for type 2 surveillance was constitutionally
valid, it did not consider whether the same was true for a scheme that provided such
authorization for intercepts or type 1 surveillance.180
Of course, the new legal order occasioned by the NSL means questions
about the constitutionality of the authorization scheme detailed in the
Implementation Rules will not be brought before the courts. The NSL excludes the
Hong Kong courts from its interpretation,181 and the CFA conceded in Lai Chee
Ying that the NSL cannot be reviewed for compatibility with the Basic Law.182
Since the Implementation Rules derive their authority directly from the NSL and
176
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are “made by the Chief Executive in conjunction with the Committee for
Safeguarding National Security,”183 then it stands to reason that they are not
reviewable by the courts either.184 Nonetheless, it is still worth considering the
purpose of the concentration in the executive branch of intercept and covert
surveillance authorization power in matters of national security.
The notion of separation of powers in Hong Kong has long been debated.185
While Deng Xiaoping argued in the 1980s that the doctrine could not apply to Hong
Kong’s relationship with the rest of China,186 after the transition of sovereignty it
nonetheless seemed that at a sub-national level Hong Kong governance reflected
the idea. The Court of Final Appeal stated in key cases that the Basic Law enshrines
the concept,187 that the courts hold the role of being a constitutional check on the
government,188 and the courts have indeed declared various laws to be inconsistent
with the Basic Law and therefore invalid since 1997.189 As recently as 2014, the
then-Chief Justice publicly stated that the Basic Law “clearly” sets out the principle
of the separation of powers.190
As political tensions have risen, there has been increasing pushback against
the idea that the doctrine has any application within Hong Kong and the debate has
re-emerged as one of popular salience rather than purely academic interest. In
particular, there appears to have been significant concern from establishment
interests about what the doctrine may imply for Hong Kong’s exercise of
independent judicial power, which is guaranteed under the Basic Law.191 In 2014,
six months after the Chief Justice’s statement referred to above, the State Council
issued a White Paper stating that under the “one country, two systems” model, the
Central Authorities maintain “overall jurisdiction” and that, in addition to
183
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government administrators, “judges” and “other judicial personnel” had to be
“patriots” who must “ensur[e] the long-term stability and prosperity of Hong
Kong.”192
In 2015, the head of the Central Authorities Liaison office in Hong Kong
stated that the “non-implementation of the separation of powers” was a “guiding
principle” in the drafting of the Basic Law.193 In 2019, in response to increasing
conflict between protestors and the police, the Government relied upon a colonialera law to declare a situation of “public danger” and enact what became popularly
known as the “anti-mask law.”194 In a politically unwelcome finding, the Court of
First Instance found that portions of the law were unconstitutional.195 Despite the
fact that the local courts have repeatedly declared legislation to be invalid as a result
of an inconsistency with the Basic Law, in response an NPC spokesperson stated
that only its Standing Committee had the right to determine the constitutionality of
local laws.196 In 2020 the phrase “separation of powers” was deleted from
secondary school textbooks.197 An Education Bureau webpage that contained a
judicially-authored PowerPoint presentation with the phrase was removed.198 Both
the Chief Executive and Central Authorities reiterated that it did not apply in Hong
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Kong, arguing that the government is instead “executive-led”.199 The Secretary of
Justice said attempts to latch onto the label without understanding it properly were
“pathetic” and that the concept had “no place” in Hong Kong’s political structure.200
That such public statements regarding the non-existence of the doctrine in
Hong Kong have suddenly emerged is of course not a random event —they must
be understood in the context of the anti-government protests which Beijing
ultimately interpreted as a threat to one of its “red lines.” For instance, the Hong
Kong and Macau Affairs Office, a central body that helps oversee local affairs of
the two SARs, stated that those who advocated for the principle of separation of
powers were seeking to “undermine the authority of the chief executive and the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, reject Beijing’s comprehensive
jurisdiction over Hong Kong… and turn Hong Kong into an independent political
entity.”201 The Central Authorities appear concerned that the doctrine cannot be
confined to sub-national matters, and that if unopposed could imply that the Hong
Kong judiciary has the power to check the actions of the Chinese state itself.202
Thus, the notion that Hong Kong is an “executive-led” government has been reasserted.
Certainly, both before and after 1997, Hong Kong’s government has been
dominated by the executive branch. But what the phrase “executive-led” means is
not entirely clear, and it is not obvious that a government cannot simultaneously be
“executive-led” and nonetheless reflect the doctrine of separation of powers in
certain ways.203 Intriguingly, the Director of the Liaison Office has advanced one
particular understanding that does seem hard to reconcile with a traditional
understanding of the separation of powers. He noted that the Basic Law defines the
199
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Chief Executive as having a dual role as both head of the HKSAR government and
as the individual accountable to the Central Authorities.204 Therefore, he argued,
the Chief Executive “transcends” the three branches.205 The full constitutional
implications of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper, but the new
intercept and surveillance authorization scheme under the Implementation Rules is
likely an early concrete example of what it means in practice. “Transcendence”
appears to be a mechanism for more directly asserting central control through local
institutions when considered necessary for the advancement of core state interests.
Offences under the NSL by definition deal with matters of national interest,
but those matters are still primarily investigated and prosecuted by local bodies: the
National Security Department of the Hong Kong police and the Department of
Justice.206 However, given the dual role of the Chief Executive, locating the
authorization power in the executive branch rather than the judicial ensures that
national interests are prioritized despite this local implementation. While the
Implementation Rules still require that the Chief Executive or directorate officer
take into account proportionality, the totality of the system seems to greatly favour
investigative needs. Under the NSL, the Chief Executive, Commissioner of Police,
and head of the police’s National Security Department will all be members of the
newly-created National Security Committee.207 It will feature an advisor (who will
sit in on all meetings) appointed directly by the Central People’s Government
(CPG).208 This Committee will be responsible for, inter alia, coordinating
operations regarding national security in Hong Kong.209 Decisions made by this
Committee are not subject to any form of judicial review; 210 the Committee is
accountable only to the CPG.211
Together, these factors suggest a system significantly more predisposed to
approve broad requests for intercepts or surveillance in cases that touch on national
security concerns than would be the case under the ICSO. As I have suggested, the
very existence of the judicial authorization aspect of the ICSO likely results in more
narrowly tailored applications, limiting either the targets or the extent of the
204
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surveillance they are put under. In contrast, the centralization of authorization
authority and the accountability of the Chief Executive to the CPG under the
concept of transcendence suggests that investigative needs are likely to take
significant priority over the privacy rights of either targets or third parties. This
tendency will only be magnified thanks to the reduction in mechanisms of external
oversight. The public will have no idea as to the extent of surveillance, let alone a
say in whether the balance between legitimate concerns about national security and
individual privacy is being struck.

CONCLUSION: TIME IS A FLAT CIRCLE
From nearly untrammelled powers for the Governor in the colonial period,
to the refusal to adopt the IOCO in 1997, to the failed attempt to introduce some
departmental-level controls in 2005, to the ICSO in 2006, and now to Art. 43 of the
NSL, the past echoes through the various permutations of the law relating to
intercepts and surveillance in Hong Kong. While the relatively detailed provisions
contained in the Implementation Rules means that the new regime appears prima
facie more restrictive than the essentially free hand given to the Governor and later
Chief Executive under § 33 of the TO, this paper has suggested the practical
difference may not in fact be that significant. In short, the residents of Hong Kong
must, to paraphrase the court in Li Man-tak, largely depend on the goodwill of the
Chief Executive to properly apply the requirements under the Implementation
Rules, including proportionality.212
While the return to something resembling the pre-2006 model occasioned
by the NSL and its Implementation Rules will indeed ease the process of
authorizing intercepts and covert surveillance when dealing with matters of national
security, that is likely not the only purpose. The new system is also about asserting
that regardless of “one country, two systems” and the promise of judicial
independence, the dominance of state organs over the local judiciary is
unquestioned. It is obviously not a coincidence that the return (in part) to an
intercept and surveillance authorization process controlled by the executive branch
has come on the heels of the political unrest of recent years. Part of the CPG’s
response to that unrest has been its assertion of “comprehensive jurisdiction” over
Hong Kong. Thanks to its concentration of authorizing authority over interceptions
and surveillance in a transcendent Chief Executive with primary accountability to
the CPG, the new scheme created by the Implementation Rules serves this
jurisdiction. It ensures the primacy of the national interest in authorizations, even
though they and the investigations they relate to are still carried out by local bodies.
The removal of judicial oversight in the context of authorizations related to national
security offences ensures that core state interests are unhampered. This is as much
212
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as a message to the local judiciary as it is a practical tool that will make
authorizations for communications intercepts and the placement of suspects under
covert surveillance easier to obtain.
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